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EXPANDING PROTECTION AGAINST
BLOCKBUSTERS THROUGH
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Margaret Wagner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore,
charged with violating the Maryland blockbusting statute.1 Despite
the language of the statute, which provided for prosecution "whether
or not acting for monetary gain,"2 the court dismissed the indictment
as fatally defective on the basis of State v. Mason,3 which held that
any indictment under the statute must allege monetary gain.4
The State of Maryland appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland, claiming that the indictment without the allegation of
monetary gain was proper. The State argued that the statute was
at least partially constitutional, that it was effective to the extent
that it prohibited actions for monetary gain. The State contended
that any indictment returned under a statute was constitutional only
to the same degree as the statute upon which it was based, and that
this indictment was within the constitutional interpretation of the
blockbusting statute. Alternatively, the State argued the entire statute
was constitutional-that it did not violate the first amendment s be-
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972). Subsection (a) states:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, whether or
not acting for monetary gain, knowingly to induce or attempt to induce
another person to transfer an interest in real property, or to discourage an-
other person from purchasing real property, by representations regarding
the existing or potential proximity of real property owned, used, or occupied
by persons of any particular race, color, religion, or national origin, or to
represent that such existing or potential proximity will or may result in: 1.
the lowering of property values; 2. a change in the racial, religious, or
ethnic character of the block, neighborhood or area in which the property
is located; 3. an increase in criminal or antisocial behavior in the area;
or 4. a decline in quality of the schools serving the area.
2. Id.
3. Criminal No. 35899 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore County, July 1, 1969), affd,
Mason v. State, 9 Md. App. 90, 262 A.2d 576 (1970).
4. Mason involved an indictment similar to that in Wagner for violation of the
same statute. The court concluded that the statute only prohibited representations
made by persons acting for monetary gain because, without that element, the
statute violated first amendment rights of freedom of speech. Therefore, any
indictment under this statute failing to allege monetary gain was fatally defective.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
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cause the language was narrowly drawn to include only speech related
to the evil of blockbusting. With this construction of the statute,
a prosecution for blockbusting activities without financial profit
could be proper, and the allegation of monetary gain in the indict-
ment was unnecessary.
Plaintiff challenged the statute on the first amendment freedom of
speech ground that the legislature here dealt with a non-commercial
area where government had no concern, alleging that the statute's
effect was to unconstitutionally prohibit statements of advice or
opinion about neighborhood situations. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland was given the opportunity to judge the constitutionality of
the Maryland blockbusting statute in State v. Wagner.6
The court evaluated the statute "on its face" and determined that
the exact prohibition of the statute was unclear because there was no
mention of the word "blockbusting" in the text of the statute. To
connect the description of criminal activity in the statute with the
practice of blockbusting, the court looked to the title and preamble
of the Act for legislative intent7 The title of the Acts clearly showed
that blockbusting was the object of the legislation. The preamble
gave evidence of the elements of the crime' and the policy reasons
which made the Act necessary.1°
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
6. 15 Md. App. 413, 291 A.2d 161 (1972).
7. "[I]t is well settled that the title of the Act can be used in conjunction
with the body of the statute to ascertain its intent, purpose and the effect." Id.
at 422, 291 A.2d at 165. See, e.g., Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v.
Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 241 A.2d 714 (1968); Truitt v. Board of Pub. Works,
243 Md. 375, 221 A.2d 370 (1966); Eisler v. Eastern States Corp., 186 Md.
251, 46 A.2d 630 (1946); Mayor & City Council v. Deegan, 163 Md. 234,
161 A. 282 (1932). Also, the preamble "may, like the title of the Act, be re-
sorted to as an aid in construing the meaning and intent of a statute where its
meaning is doubtful." 15 Md. App. at 422, 291 A.2d at 166. See, e.g., National
Can Corp. v. State Tax Conm'n, 220 Md. 418, 153 A.2d 287 (1959); Ham-
mond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A.2d 474 (1950).
8. "'Blockbusting' prohibited; penalty." Mi. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A
(1972).
9. In describing the purpose of the Act (Chapter 285 of the Acts of 1966),
the title [preamble] specified that it was "to prohibit the practice of induc-
ing the transfer of real property or discouraging the purchase of real prop-
erty by knowingly representing the existing or potential proximity of prop-
erty owned or occupied by persons of any particular race, color, religion or
national origin or that this proximity of persons will result in certain happen-
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The court looked to previous judicial definitions of blockbusting
in order to justify the legislature's definition," The thrust here was
to show that despite the variance in written descriptions, everyone
knew generally what constituted the practice of blockbusting. Also,
the court acknowledged the undesirable effects of blockbusting on the
community and stressed that blockbusting is an "evil" practice. 2
Finally, the court interpreted the language of the preamble stating
that blockbusting occurs "usually for purposes of financial profit"
13
to mean that the legislature did not intend to restrict the crime only
to activity for monetary gain.
The first amendment challenge was resolved in favor of the State.
It is well settled that first amendment freedom of speech enjoys the
protection of having a "preferred position" under law.14 Government,
however, retains a legitimate concern in preserving the public peace
and safety of society.15 Since freedom of speech is not absolute,16 the
legislature may properly limit the exercise of speech when it is part
of conduct prohibited by reasonable legislation.'
ings affecting the use or enjoyment of the property, this practice being
generally known as 'blockbusting."
15 Md. App. at 420, 291 A.2d at 164. The court saw this passage as the critical
link tying together the language of the statute and its purpose.
10. The court quoted the preamble of the Act: "the practice known as
'blockbusting' is disruptive to the peace, tranquility, and general good order of
the State of Maryland . . . . This practice cheats homeowners, increases inter-
group tensions, promotes neighborhood instability, and creates ghettos which do
harm to the citizens of Maryland .... ." Id. at 420, 291 A.2d at 165.
11. The court quoted definitions of "blockbusting" from Summer v. Township
of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969), and from Brief for Appellee at 2,
State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 291 A.2d 161 (1972).
12. 15 Md. App. at 422, 291 A.2d at 166. "The legislature further char-
acterized 'blockbusting' in the preamble as 'this unscrupulous practice, which
utilizes and promotes panic, fear, and hate .... '" Id. at 420, 291 A.2d at 165.
13. Id. at 423, 291 A.2d at 166.
14. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
15. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
16. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). This case involved
an Illinois law prohibiting racial and religious propaganda that tended to incite
breaches of the peace. Plaintiff challenged the law on first amendment freedom
of speech grounds. The Court held that if the legislation was reasonable, it was
not necessary to consider the "clear and present danger" test usually used in free
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The court in Wagner held that the Maryland blockbusting statute
was reasonable because the speech prohibited by the statute was not
mere conversations between neighbors, but rather, speech which
formed part of a course of conduct known as "blockbusting."' 8 The
court cited Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. " to support the
position that it "has long been fundamental that where speech is an
integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protec-
tion."20 It may be difficult in some cases to decide whether speech
should be viewed in isolation or as part of a course of conduct.2' In
Wagner, however, the court took great pains to characterize block-
busting as a "practice" and to stress the evil of blockbusting as un-
lawful conduct, thus bringing the Maryland statute within the
Giboney rule and thereby withstanding the first amendment chal-
lenge.
To realize the impact of holding the Maryland blockbusting statute
constitutional, it is necessary to compare the language of the Mary-
land statute with the federal blockbusting statute. Wagner held con-
stitutional a blockbusting statute which allows prosecution of vio-
lators "whether or not acting for monetary gain."22 In contrast, the
federal blockbusting statute is restricted to activities done "for
profit."2 3 The courts have had some difficulty in justifying congres-
speech cases. The Court determined that this statute was reasonable because of a
history of racial violence in the State; therefore, the statute withstood the first
amendment challenge.
18. 15 Md. App. at 432, 291 A.2d at 166.
19. 336 U.S. 490 (1949). In Giboney, the picketing activities of an ice ped-
dler's union were enjoined because the sole purpose of the picketing was to in-
duce a company to agree not to sell ice to non-union peddlers. The Supreme
Court held that picketing for this purpose was speech used as an integral part
of unlawful conduct, and the picketing here was used in violation of a state
statute forbidding agreements in restraint of trade.
20. 15 Md. App. at 423, 291 A.2d at 166.
21. See Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sill v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Speake v. Grant-
ham, 317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970), aft'd, 440 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 56, § 230A (1972).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970) states that it shall be unlawful:
"For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the
neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin."
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sional authority to pass the federal statute,24 but it has been held
constitutional under the enabling clause of the thirteenth amend-
ment25 as a rational means "to provide, within constitutional limita-
tions, for fair housing throughout the United States. '26
The federal blockbusting statute was passed to meet a "need for
Federal action to compensate for the lack of effective protection and
prosecution on the local level,"27 and the words "for profit" were
added due to concern that, without such limitation, serious first
amendment problems would arise.28 The federal statute was chal-
lenged on the first amendment ground that it made mere speech
unlawful.9 Several federal district courts have rejected this argument,
holding that the "for profit" requirement under the statute made the
activity "commercial,"30 thereby putting the speech involved within
the commercial exception to the first amendment3s
24. The federal blockbusting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970), was part of
the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Supreme Court
found general congressional authority for that legislation in the thirteenth
amendment by holding that housing discrimination against blacks constituted a
"badge of slavery." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The
Jones case excluded the blockbusting provision from its inquiry, however, which
left the lower courts to decide whether there was a "badge of slavery" involved
in blockbusting. The real problem was that whites could bring suit under §
3604(e), and courts would be hard pressed to construe a blockbuster's activities
against a white person as a "badge of slavery." The courts first confronted this
problem in Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
Instead of discussing "badges of slavery," the court in Brown focused on the
stated legislative policy behind passage of the Act: "to provide, within constitu.
tional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." Id. at 1240.
The court then held that § 3604(e) was constitutional because the enabling
clause of the thirteenth amendment justified congressional attempts to achieve
this goal.
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 2 states: "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." As expressed in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment
clothed "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Id. at 20.
26. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969).
27. Legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM.
NEws, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1840 (1968).
28. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
29. United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd, 459
F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1104 (1973) ; United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 474 F.2d
115 (5th Cir. 1973).
30. See cases cited note 29 supra.
31. See generally Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965).
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Speech that is involved in a commercial context does not enjoy the
same protection of a "preferred position" afforded to expression of
racial, religious, or political views.3 2 The general rule is that when
a person is engaged in "the market place of affairs rather than
ideas,"3s he is subject to valid regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions.
Despite the language that activity under the federal blockbusting
statute must be done "for profit," the courts have not clearly resolved
exactly what activity gives rise to the commercial exception in the
blockbusting area.34 One federal district court held that "an honest
answer to a question put by the owner of a dwelling" s was outside
the commercial exception and thereby protected by the first amend-
to mean "for the purpose of obtaining financial gain in any form,"3 8
and Brown v. State Realty Co.A9 gave injunctive relief to petitioners
where the blockbusters had received no actual profit.40 United States
v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.41 was the first case in which a United
32. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970);
New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 834 (1950).
33. Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
834 (1950).
34. Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170, 186 (1970); Note, Legal Control of
Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 145.
35. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
36. Id. Another case dealing with this problem was Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 App.
Div. 2d 104, 267 N.Y.S.2d 265, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 619, 219 N.E.2d 287, 272
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1966), which involved a New York rule prohibiting blockbusting
very similar to the federal statute. The case did not discuss a constitutional ques-
tion but held that mere advice to prospective purchasers about the racial composi-
tion of the neighborhood did not violate the New York rule. The court said as long
as the information was accurate and did not promote racial bias, it was per-
missible.
37. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
38. Id. at 1311.
39. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
40. The conviction in the Brown case was for an attempt to blockbust. The
blockbusters (real estate agents) did not succeed in causing the people they
approached to sell their homes. The court held the failure to realize an actual
profit because of no sale did not prevent conviction under the statute, because
the prospect of commissions was inherent in every real estate listing. Id. at 1241.
41. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
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States court of appeals decided the constitutionality of the federal
statute. The federal district court ignored the commercial exception
in upholding the federal statute against a first amendment challenge.
That court held the statute regulated conduct, and any inhibiting
effect it may have on speech was justified by the governmental in,
terest in preventing housing discrimination.42 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit relied on the commercial exception argument
as well as the reasoning used by the district court in upholding the
federal statute. Judicial treatment of the federal blockbusting statute
indicates that courts are unsure of the limits of the commercial excep-
tion in the blockbusting area. The Bob Lawrence case suggests that
courts, when dealing with first amendment challenges, may be willing
to look beyond the commercial exception and strict interpretation of
the words "for profit" to evaluate the effect of the conduct involved
in blockbusting infringements.
The federal government is not alone in recognizing the need for
blockbusting statutes; some states and municipalities have acknowl-
edged the blockbusting problem and have enacted civil legislation to
combat it. 4 3 Significant among municipal legislation is the Chicago
ordinance held constitutional in Chicago Real Estate Board v. City
of Chicago.44 This ordinance was similar to the federal statute in
42. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga.
1970). The argument used in the lower court to sustain the federal statute was
the same argument used to sustain the Maryland statute in Wagner. The Bob
Lawrence decision was cited in Wagner in the court's first amendment discussion
to. support the constitutionality of the Maryland statute. 15 Md. App. at 423,
291 A.2d at 166. The Fifth Circuit decision in the Bob Lawrence case had not
yet been rendered at the time Wagner was heard.
43. Some states have used civil rather than criminal statutes to prohibit
blockbusting. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. R V. §§ 20-320 (11), 20-328 (1969)
and N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(3) (McKinney 1972). (These states have given
state licensing agencies the power to revoke or suspend real estate brokers'
licenses for blockbusting.) See also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 87AAA
(Supp. 1972) and VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, § 2295 (Supp. 1973) (these states
have prohibited only representations inducing sales which were falsely and fraud-
ulently made).
44. 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967). Another important blockbusting
ordinance was the Teaneck, New Jersey ordinance upheld in Summer v. Town-
ship of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969). The ordinance forbade a
canvass or listing for sale of real property unless a prescribed form was filed with
the township clerk prior to the date on which the canvass was to take place.
There was no mention of the first amendment in upholding the ordinance, and
the main issue in that case was whether the municipality had the authority to
enact the ordinance.
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prohibiting real estate brokers from soliciting sales of realty from
white persons on the ground that loss of value would ensue because
blacks had moved or were moving into a neighborhood. Free speech
objections to this ordinance were rejected, despite its application
only to real estate brokers necessarily operating for profit, on the
ground that "[w]here speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct,
it has no constitutional protection." 45 The court held blockbusting
could be prohibited because it was part of the unlawful conduct of
racial discrimination in housing.
There are striking similarities among the provisions of the Mary-
land statute and other state statutes which have dealt with the block-
busting problem by direct criminal statute.48 For example: (1) The
statutes are not restricted to real estate agents. The extent of cover-
age is against "persons," "corporations," "firms," or "associations." 47
(2) The statutes provide for prosecution of attempts as well as suc-
cessful inducements.48 (3) There is no mention of the word block-
busting in the statutes. 49 (4) The same language is used in the
statutes to specify the types of prohibited representations which may
constitute blockbusting.50 There is, however, an important difference
45. Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 552-53, 224
N.E.2d 793, 807 (1967). The court was able to ignore any requirement that
the activity be done for profit by characterizing the practice of blockbusting as
"a handmaiden of the other discriminatory practices declared unlawful in this
ordinance." Id. at 553, 224 N.E.2d at 807. This is another example of block-
busting legislation which ostensibly requires monetary gain being upheld against
first amendment challenge with the same argument used in Wagner.
46. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51 (Smith-Hurd 1970); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (9) (Page Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22 (2),
(2m) (1973).
47. The Ohio and Wisconsin blockbusting statutes apply to "persons" only.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (9) (Page Supp. 1972); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 101.22 (2), (2m) (1973). The Illinois blockbusting statute applies to "any
person or corporation." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
The Maryland blockbusting statute applies to "any person, firm, corporation, or
association." MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (a) (1972).
48. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51 (Smith-Hurd 1970); Onro REv. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (9) (Page Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A
(1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22 (2), (2m) (1973).
49. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 70-51 (Smith-Hurd 1970); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (9) (Page Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A
(1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22 (2), (2m) (1973).
50. The Maryland, Ohio and Wisconsin blockbusting statutes all list these
four descriptions which blockbusting representations may take in order to be
prosecuted under the statute: 1. the lowering of property values; 2. a change in
the racial, religious, or ethnic composition of the block, neighborhood, or area
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in that nowhere in these other state statutes is there mention of
monetary gain. In the absence of this language, each of these statutes
may be construed to include non-monetary gain activities, as was the
Maryland statute. Because there have been no cases construing these
statutes to date, one can only speculate as to how they will be in-
terpreted.51
Courts that have evaluated blockbusting statutes seem anxious to
uphold the statutes whenever possible because of the widely rec-
ognized undesirable effects of blockbusting. Some courts have used the
commercial exception to the first amendment to uphold blockbusting
statutes against free speech objections when the statute required ac-
tivity done "for profit."5 2 Other courts, even when limited by profit
activity language, have gone beyond the commercial exception to
uphold blockbusting statutes. These courts have used the argument
that any speech involved in blockbusting was part of unlawful con-
duct.53 Because these decisions view prevention of the unlawful con-
duct of discrimination through blockbusting as more important than
in which the property is located; 3. an increase in criminal or antisocial behavior
in the area; and 4. a decline in the quality of the schools serving the area.
MrD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972); OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (H)
(9) (Page Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22 (2), (2m) (1973).
5 1. There are several reasons why there have been no cases litigated under these
statutes to date. The procedures under the statutes may inhibit many people from
filing complaints because of the bureaucratic lag in time before securing relief.
The Wisconsin statute provides for a Department of Industry, Labor, and Human
Relations which must make an investigation before judicial review of a complaint.
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22 (2), (2m) (1973). The Ohio statute provides for
an Ohio Civil Rights Commission which investigates blockbusting complaints.
Onio RLv. CODE ANN,. § 4112.02 (H)(9) (Page Supp. 1972). See also Lake-
wood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 23 Ohio Misc. 211, 52 Ohio Op. 2d
213, 258 N.E.2d 470 (C.P. of Allen County 1970), where the court, comment-
ing on the Ohio blockbusting statute, said that the procedure for violations was
so cumbersome that many victims thought it was not worth making a complaint.
Even prosecutions under statutes with no elaborate procedure may be difficult
to obtain because of the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. Legal Control of Blockbusting, supra note 34, at 162. An additional
reason for lack of prosecutions is the hesitancy of local prosecutors to prosecute
white collar criminals. Blockbusting, supra note 34, at 174.
52. See Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
53. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), afJ'd, 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v.
City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967).
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adhering to the strict limitation of "for profit" language, it is possible
to read these cases as an indirect recognition that blockbusting need
not necessarily involve monetary gain.
The Maryland statute takes the next logical step and includes the
language "whether or not acting for monetary gain ' 54 in its block-
busting statute. State v. Wagner is important because it held the
Maryland statute, with its unique language, constitutional. The
decision held that the statute was to be construed to include non-
monetary gain activity, and also recognized that blockbusting statutes
no longer need include restrictive profit language to withstand first
amendment challenges. State v. Wagner is the latest step in combat-
ing blockbusting and insuring enforcement against blockbusters who
seek ways to evade the laws.- 5
M. Deborah Benoit
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972).
55. Legal Control of Blockbusting, supra note 34, at 170.
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